Belief Logics -BAN Syntax • P |≡ X P believes X • P ? X P sees X • P |~ X P once said X • P |? X P has jurisdiction over X • #(X) X is fresh A |≡(S |≡ ( Kb ? B)) To verify this belief A |≡# ( Kb ? B) In the second message there is no nonce, the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack based on reusing old keys (same problem in step 5).
• CSP describes system behavior with events that can occur.
• Alphabet (? ) is the collection of events that a process can engage.
• Trace model of CSP describes process's behavior with set of the traces,which are sequences of events.
CSP Syntax and Semantics
• STOP Does nothing.
• e ? P Performs event e and behaves like P • P 1 ? P 2
Non-deterministically behaves like P 1 or P 2
• P 1 [|X|] P 2 Parallel composition of P 1 and P 2 • P\ X Behaves like P, but events in X are hidden • P[e 1 ? e' 1 , …, e n ? e' n ] Behaves like P, except each event e i is relabeled to e' i • P ? Q Q refines P ( If P corresponds to a specification of permissible behavior, then Q is guaranteed to exhibit only permissible behaviors.
CSP Syntax and Semantics (cont.)
• Simplified versions of the protocol Modeling the Intruder (cont.)
• Verifying Authentication (cont.)
Intruder impersonates A when communicating with B.
B commits to a session with A, although A never even attempted to communicate with B.
• Certification authorities -Principals with authority to assure the correctness of the associations between keys and principals
• Certificates -Data structures, which associate keys with principals
Multiple Certification-Authority (MCA) Network CA1« CA2» is digitally signed with CA1 's private key to certify that key CA2 p is CA2 's public key. CA2« P » is digitally signed with CA2's private key to certify that key B p is B 's public key.
CA1 CA2
A B Authentication Logic
• Principals making statement -P says s -Statements can be tracked back to some digitally signed statement
• Principals speaking for principals -P p ? P -Statements that are digitally signed using P p will be inferred to be statements made by P.
• (P ? Q) ? ((P says s) ? (Q says s))
-Whenever a principal P speaks for Q and makes a statement s, it is safe to behave as Q made the statement s.
MCA Analysis 
